Outside the Battlefield: In-group Political Dynamics of Civil Conflict Negotiations and Settlements Sema Hande Ogutcu-Fu, Ph.D. Center on Democratic Performance Binghamton University (SUNY) hogutcu1@binghamton.edu Published in Political Research Quarterly, 2016, 69(3): 403–417 Abstract What increases warring parties’ ability to reach a negotiated settlement? In this study, I answer this question by examining the political environment a government and rebel group leadership internally encounter during a peace process. I disaggregate in-group dynamics of governments and rebels into their respective political elements that either grant autonomy or create constraints for resolution, namely, their constituencies and elites. I argue that willingness to end fighting does not always translate into the ability to make concessions. While battlefield related indicators may increase the likelihood of negotiations, it is internal cohesion that increases combatants’ credibility as bargaining partners and improves the likelihood of settlement. To test these arguments, I introduce original data on negotiations for internal conflict-dyad-years between 1980 and 2005. Findings using two-stage censored probit models demonstrate that war-weariness increases willingness for negotiations while internal consensus creates opportunity for settlement. Keywords civil conflict, negotiated settlement, negotiations, peace agreement, rebel group