A communicative turnaround: Shifting the burden of proof in European fisheries governance Sebastian Linke a,n , Svein Jentoft b a Department of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden b Norwegian College of Fishery Science, University of Tromsø, Norway article info Article history: Received 14 May 2012 Received in revised form 7 June 2012 Accepted 8 June 2012 Available online 11 July 2012 Keywords: Reversed burden of proof Common Fisheries Policy Regional Advisory Councils Interactive governance Knowledge interaction abstract Current and prospective changes in European fisheries governance suggest not only a ‘‘communicative turn’’ but a complete turnaround in the relationships between government, science, and the fishing industry. At the heart of these changes are the so-called Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) and the idea of partially replacing the burden of proof on the resource users (fishing industry). This change entails new forms of interaction between fishers’ representatives, other stakeholders (e.g. NGOs), policy- makers and scientists. By drawing on experiences from the Baltic Sea RAC, the analysis focuses on two aspects of fisheries governance: institutional design and the process of negotiation and decision-making. It is concluded that to allow for a partial shift in the burden of proof, stakeholder organisations such as RACs need to adapt both institutionally as well as process-wise to enable a more constructive and responsible fisheries governance system. & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Recent reforms of the European Unions (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) suggest a paradigm shift in fisheries governance that entails a turnaround in the communicative relationships between various stakeholders and fisheries management. The current CFP builds upon a highly centralised, top-down and almost exclu- sively science-based governing process. Recent changes in this governance structure allow for more stakeholder participation via the so-called Regional Advisory Councils (RACs). Proposals of a ‘‘reversed burden of proof’’ (RBP) on the resource users (the fishing industry) would involve new ways of interaction, includ- ing how knowledge is communicated and verified among the involved parties: scientists, fishers and other stakeholders (e.g. non-governmental organisations—NGOs). The concept of an RBP in fisheries governance under the CFP has been put forth in the recent Green Paper [1]. According to this model, it is the responsibility of the industry and not national or international governing agencies to demonstrate that fisheries operate responsibly in return for fishing access. An RBP therefore entails a substantial shift in the way that fisheries are governed: instead of agencies such as the European Commission or national governments having to prove that a fishing plan (e.g. a catch quota) does irreversible harm to the ecosystem, it is up to the resource users (the fishing industry) to demonstrate in advance that such an activity is not likely to inflict serious damage. This shift in management responsibility imposes various challenges and risks but also new opportunities for a more sustainable governance of the seas. It is still unclear to what extent and how an RBP, coupling rights and responsibilities to the industry will be introduced and implemented in European fisheries gov- ernance. However, because this topic has been addressed in various policy and academic circles as a promising way forward [2–6], particularly in the advent of the next CFP reform, this paper explores the possible consequences of an RBP by focusing on the EU fisheries system. The paper follows two recent CFP reform processes (2002 and 2012) and addresses the changing role of stakeholders under the shift from a traditionally linear science–policy interface towards a more interactive governance system that involves actors beyond scientists and policy-makers: fishers, NGOs and other interest groups. Two aspects of reforming fisheries governance under the CFP are considered: institutional design and the process of delib- eration, negotiation and decision-making. Although the RACs were initially created to give the industry greater influence over fisheries management, they are not intended to fulfil the role of reversing the burden of proof. However, in the current EU system, they are the only stakeholder-led organisations that can assume such a role. Drawing upon lessons from the Baltic RAC, this paper discusses the potential role of the RACs under an RBP. It asks whether and Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol Marine Policy 0308-597X/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.06.011 n Corresponding author. Tel.: þ46 31 7864754. E-mail addresses: sebastian.linke@gu.se (S. Linke), svein.jentoft@uit.no (S. Jentoft). Marine Policy 38 (2013) 337–345