1 (Penultimate version. The final version is due to be published in the European Journal of Philosophy) Belief, Correctness and Constitutivity Davide Fassio ABSTRACT: Some philosophers have argued that a standard of correctness is constitutive of the concept or the essence of belief. By this claim they mean, roughly, that a mental state is a belief partially in virtue of being correct if and only if its content is true. In this paper I provide a new argument in support of the constitutivity of the correctness standard for belief. I first argue that the standard expresses a conceptual necessity. Then I argue that, since conceptual necessities are such in virtue of some concept, the standard must also be necessary in virtue of some concept. Finally, I provide an argument by exclusion to the effect that the standard is necessary in virtue of the concept of belief. KEYWORDS: Doxastic correctness; Constitutive norms; Belief. Recently some philosophers have suggested that beliefs are governed by a norm requiring or permitting that one believe only the truth. 1 Such philosophers identify this truth-norm with the following standard of correctness: DC) a belief is correct if and only if the believed proposition is true These philosophers also argue that this standard of correctness is constitutive of the essence or the concept of belief. With this claim they mean, roughly, that a mental state is a belief partially in virtue of being correct if and only if its content is true. A mental state having a true content but not being correct would simply not be a belief and could not be conceived as such. These philosophers think that the fact that beliefs are constitutively governed by such a normative standard can explain, among other things, the relation between belief and truth, 1 See, for example, Boghossian 2003, Brandom 2001, Engel 2008, 2013, Gibbard 2005, Lynch 2009, Railton 1994, Shah 2003, Shah & Velleman 2005, Wedgwood 2002, 2013.