IRRELEVANT OR INDISPENSIBLE? THE STATE OF THE U.N. IN THE AFTERMATH OF IRAQ William R. Patterson Old Dominion University Virginia Social Science Journal, 2010, Vol. 45, pages 48-66 ABSTRACT In the aftermath of the United Nations’ refusal to authorize the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush predicted that the institution would become irrelevant in the realm of international affairs. The institution, he said, had failed to live up to its responsibilities and had not enforced its own resolutions. It had displayed its impotence in the face of Saddam Hussein’s defiance and had therefore demonstrated its own insignificance. This article looks back at that claim and judges its accuracy. By examining the U.N.’s activity in the General Assembly, in the Security Council, in subsidiary organs and in peacekeeping missions, the article quantifies U.N. relevance in the first five years following the invasion. INTRODUCTION n the morning of September 12, 2002, a year and a day after the terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon, President Bush spoke before the General Assembly of the United Nations. He made a strong (though flawed) case that Iraq was seeking weapons of mass destruction in violation of numerous United Nations resolutions. He argued that “Iraq’s government openly praised the attacks of September the 11 th . And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq” (Bush, 2002). Iraq constituted a grave threat, Bush contended, not only to America, but also to the relevancy of the United Nations and to the functioning of world order. “The conduct of the Iraqi regime,” he said, “is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. The entire world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored O