TIM MA UDLIN* SUBSTANCES AND SPACE-TIME: WHAT ARISTOTLE WOULD HAVE SAID TO EINSTEIN Abstract-This essay consists of two parts. The first is an exegetical analysis of the “stripping” argument of Metaphysics 2.3. I contend that the passage is not in propria persona and that the resolution of the aporia depends upon a careful consideration of the metaphysical relationship between essential properties and the subjects of which they are predicated. The second part applies this conclusion to a problem recently raised by John Earman and John Norton about whether the general theory of relativity is compatible with both determinism and a substantiva- list interpretation of space-time. I argue that their difficulty can be avoided by an Aristotelian account of the essential properties of space-time. Introduction zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTS LIKE EMPEDOCLES’ jbuyevij drv&hrp~,pa (“man-faced ox-progeny”) this essay will doubtless appear to be an ungainly, if not monstrous, concatenation of diverse topics. To conjoin exegesis of Aristotle’s Metaphysics with an examina- tion of the general theory of relativity must seem an act both ahistorical and philosophically perverse. And indeed, the marriage of these subjects is not an entirely happy one. Detail in the textual analysis has been suppressed in favor of a concise statement of the metaphysical moral. Still, the advantages afforded by this peculiar conjunction outweigh the drawbacks, for it illustrates the relevance of long-standing philosophical analyses to modern problems, problems which often present themselves in a gaudy technical garb. Although Aristotle had no notion of anything like modem physics, some of the puzzles he grappled with are exactly those which we face in trying to interpret our scientific theories. I hope to show that some of the recent debates concerning the status of space-time in general relativity afford a case in point. Aristotle’s Meraphysics is a tract concerned with being, and the central books focus on those entities which most unqualifiedly partake in being: substances. Book 2, in particular, is devoted to tbe articulation of criteria by which to distinguish substances from non-substances; to the identification of substances; and to examinations both of the relationship between substances *Rutgers University, Department of Philosophy, Davison Hall, Douglass Campus, New Bruns- wick, NJ 08903. U.S.A. Received 25 March 1989; in revised form 6 October 1989. Stud. Hisr. Phil. Sri., Vol. 21, NO. 4, pp. 531-561, 1990. 0039-3681/90 $3.00 + 0.00 Printed in Great Britain. @ 1990. Pergamon Press pk. 531