The G-20 Since the Global Financial Crisis: Neither Hegemony nor Collectivism  Tom Chodor This article analyzes the sources of gridlock in the Group of 20 since the global financial crisis. It engages with this question through Mark Beeson and Stephen Bell’s framework, which identifies two processes of socializa- tion operating concurrently within the G-20: hegemonic incorporation and collectivist cooperation. While hegemonic incorporation seeks to so- cialize the rising Southern powers into the US-led world order, their inclu- sion over time drives the G-20 toward more collective and cooperative forms of global governance. The article argues that the GFC has altered this equation in two ways: by accelerating the shift of economic power from the North to the South, and by undermining the hegemony of ne- oliberalism in the South. These two developments have made the United States less willing to offer the concessions necessary for hegemonic incor- poration while, at the same time, bolstering the confidence of the South- ern powers. Consequently, the article proposes that both hegemonic incorporation and collectivist cooperation are undermined, leading in- stead to gridlock and fragmentation. The article illustrates this argument through a case study of the gridlock surrounding the issue of global im- balances. Keywords: G-20, Global South, hegemony. WHEN IT WAS RELAUNCHED DURING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (GFC), the Group of 20 (G-20) embodied hopes for a more effective and represen- tative global governance system. However, the institution has since lost momentum, facing growing criticism regarding its relevance and efficacy, with a recent summit described by one observer as “a deep disappointment for all who had hoped and needed the G-20 leaders to confront and control today’s central global challenges.” 1 Rather than becoming the world’s pre- mier forum for international economic cooperation, the G-20 has suc- cumbed to gridlock, struggling to tackle key issues on the global agenda. This reflects a larger “breakdown of global cooperation” identified by Thomas Hale et al., resulting in a “growing gap between our need for global solutions and the flagging ability of multilateral institutions to meet that need.” One of the key causes of this gridlock is “the rise of new pow- ers representing a more diverse array of interests,” which “makes intergov- ernmental agreement more difficult.” 2 While polarization within the G-20 is not confined to North-South lines—there are divisions on a number of lev- els, including between the United States and Europe—this is the most important divide for the institution, given its primary purpose of socializing 205 Global Governance 23 (2017), 205–223