Strategic Assessment | Volume 20 | No. 1 | April 2017 23 The Deradicalization of Islamists by Islamists: Hamas’s Kid Glove Approach to Salai Jihadists in the Gaza Strip, 2010-2014 Björn Brenner By 2009, below the surface of public denial, the growing Salai jihadist presence in Gaza aroused much concern within Hamas and was closely monitored, even though the Hamas government’s oficial response was a irm refusal to acknowledge the slightest concern. Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh rejected allegations in the international media of any global jihadi presence in Gaza, insisting, “There are no extremist organisations or groups on Gazan soil.” 1 However, in conversations in more informal settings, Hamas leaders admitted that their internal concerns over the issue were growing. 2 In 2010, the Hamas government communicated these concerns to the external wing of the movement. According to a letter sent from the Gaza leadership to the Hamas politburo in Damascus, the extensive efforts at reconciliation until then were seen as failures, and a harsher approach was suggested, with the goal of eliminating the extremist groups entirely. 3 Another letter, sent by Ahmed Jaabari, at the time the commander-in-chief of the Qassam Brigades, to the head of the politburo, Khaled Mashal, warned him of the potentially deteriorating situation in Gaza. 4 Apart from the 2009 proclamation of an Islamic caliphate in Rafah and other incidents, there were some ominous signs of a more broadly based violent radicalization underway in Gaza. For instance, for three Dr. Björn Brenner is a lecturer at the Swedish Defence University in Stockholm and a visiting fellow at Institut français du Proche-Orient in Amman, Jordan. This article draws from his recent book, Gaza under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance.