AUTHOR COPY © 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1741-3591 International Journal of Disclosure and Governance Vol. 10, 4, 311–327 www.palgrave-journals.com/jdg/ INTRODUCTION This article presents empirical evidence on associations between corporate disclosure qual- ity and governance mechanism in Pakistan. Despite the enormous potential and attrac- tive business opportunities in Pakistan, inves- tors hesitate to come to this potential market because of frequent change in government pol- icies, slow implementation of good decisions, corruption, international political situation and law and order situation. In order to promote sound investment atmosphere, the govern- ment enacted Corporate Governance Act in 2002. A major part of this act provides rules for information disclosure for organisations. Thus, in this study, we examine whether corporate governance is providing an effi- cient institutional mechanism that encour- ages listed firms to adopt quality disclosure practices. The purpose of the study is to bring to light governance factors that help listed firms to adopt quality disclosure practices. This article predicts that stringent governance practice leads to higher disclosure quality and hereby reduces information asymmetry problem. Governance Original Article Impact of board leadership and audit quality on disclosure quality: Evidence from Pakistan Received (in revised form): 7th February 2013 Safia Nosheen is a Lecturer at the Gomal University in Dera Ismail Khan, Pakistan. She is currently enrolled as a PhD student in the Asian Institute of Technology. Supasith Chonglerttham has been working as a Senior Instructor at the School of Management (SOM) since 1 July 2010. He obtained his PhD in Finance in 2009 from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, Hawaii, USA and an MBA in Finance in 2005 from Tulane University, USA. ABSTRACT This article examines relationships between governance characteristics and disclosure quality in an emerging economy of Pakistan. Regression analysis supports agency theory and shows that CEO duality is negatively related to disclosure quality, whereas ownership concentra- tion and audit quality positively influence disclosure quality. This article also finds, through an interaction term in regression models, that ownership concentration becomes a negative influence on disclosure quality when firms have CEO duality. This study helps academicians and policy- makers to understand how disclosure could be affected by corporate governance. Policymakers could apply the results to further promote good governance in Pakistan. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance (2013) 10, 311–327. doi:10.1057/jdg.2013.7; published online 14 March 2013 Keywords: corporate disclosure; CEO duality; ownership concentration; audit quality; panel data regression Correspondence: Safia Nosheen School of Management, Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand