6/5/2017 Reassessing ASEAN on the South China Sea: What the 30th ASEAN Summit Can Tell Us about its Utility | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative https://amti.csis.org/reassessingaseansummitutility/ 1/5 BY KEI KOGA (HTTPS://AMTI.CSIS.ORG/AUTHOR/KKOGA/) | JUNE 2, 2017 (HTTPS://AMTI.CSIS.ORG/REASSESSING-ASEAN-SUMMIT-UTILITY/) SOUTHEAST ASIA (HTTPS://AMTI.CSIS.ORG/CATEGORY/SOUTHEAST-ASIA/) The results of the 30 ASEAN Summit, held in Manila on April 29, were somewhat disappointing—though not surprising. The chairman’s statement (http://asean.org/storage/2017/04/Chairs-Statement-of-30th-ASEAN-Summit_FINAL.pdf) did not come close to addressing the ongoing concerns of reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea, and in fact did not even mention them (in contrast to recent statements in Laos (http://asean.org/storage/2016/08/Final-Chairmans- Statement-of-the-28th-and-29th-ASEAN-Summits-rev-án.pdf) and Malaysia (http://www.asean.org/wp- content/uploads/2015/12/Final-Chairmans-Statement-of-27th-ASEAN-Summit-25-November-2015.pdf)). The statement also shortchanged the importance of international law. Although the document did mention the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it only raised it in a diluted general context, not in the South China Sea section. Whereas previous documents emphasized peaceful resolution of the South China Sea disputes “in accordance with international law”, this year’s statement cited only “universally recognized principles of international law”, sidestepping any impact of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Tribunal award (https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1801). It is now clear that ASEAN failed to forge a united political front against provocative actions in the South China Sea, and that the ASEAN chairman’s statement withdrew the concerns of earlier years in order to avoid provoking China. The question, then, is: has ASEAN weakness forced a shift to better accommodate China? Must ASEAN step back from the knotty South China Sea issue to make strides in other areas, such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and the ongoing North Korean crisis? The answer is “no”. ASEAN does have a political role to play in the South China Sea disputes. ASEAN has brought the awareness of the international community to the South China Sea, and shaped international perceptions by issuing press releases, chairman’s statements, and joint declarations. However, these efforts have had the secondary effect of casting ASEAN as seemingly the only multilateral regional framework capable of dealing with the South China Sea issue, which is not true. Therefore, it is important to assess the utility of ASEAN in the South China Sea in a more balanced way, and to acknowledge four institutional limitations of ASEAN in regards to the South China Sea. th REASSESSING ASEAN ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: WHAT THE 30TH ASEAN SUMMIT CAN TELL US ABOUT ITS UTILITY