Philosophy and Phenomenological Research doi: 10.1111/phpr.12379 © 2017 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC Constructivism, Strict Compliance, and Realistic Utopianism BEN LAURENCE University of Chicago §1: Introduction The primary concern of political philosophy is justice. Since philosophy is a reflective enterprise, this naturally takes the form of constructing a theory of justice. Famously, John Rawls divides this theory into two parts that he calls ideal and nonideal theory. In this essay I argue that Rawls runs together two quite different conceptions of this concep- tual dyad. Picking up on his language, I call them “the strict compliance/partial compli- ance conception” and “the realistic utopia/transitional conception”. 1 I argue that it is confused to treat these conceptions as ways of describing the same distinction. They employ different criteria of classification, are motivated by different concerns, and have different practical upshots. This raises the question of how, if at all, these heterogeneous dyads are to be related to one another. I draw on aspects of Rawls’ thought to present a rational reconstruction of his view shorn of the confusion. On this amended view, strict compliance is a local assumption motivated by his constructivist account of the principles of justice. With these principles in hand, we loosen the assumption of strict compliance to construct a realistic utopia. My proposal on Rawls’ behalf is that we view strict compliance theory as a moment in a broader project of ideal theorizing along realistic utopian lines that also has partial compliance moments. While this emendation absolves Rawls of the confusion, and seems true to his intentions, I argue that it runs into trouble nonetheless. Although the realistic utopia/transitional conception is well motivated, the strict compliance moment of ideal theory is problematic even in its more limited role. One upshot of my discussion is that we can embrace the division of the theory of jus- tice into ideal and nonideal theory, while rejecting the strict compliance understanding of ideal theory. Critics who reject a role for ideal theory by arguing against the strict com- pliance conception may be justified in their complaints. But they move too quickly, when 1 In this essay, I am indebted two helpful discussions that each marks some version of this distinction. The first is Laura Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map” in Philosophy Compass 7/9 (2012): 654–664. The second is Zofia Stemplowska and Adam Swift, “Rawls on Ideal and Nonideal The- ory” in A Companion to Rawls, edited by Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy, John Wiley and Sons (Chich- ester: 2014). CONSTRUCTIVISM, STRICT COMPLIANCE, AND REALISTIC UTOPIANISM 1 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research