International Regulation without International Government: Improving IO Performance through Orchestration Kenneth W. Abbott, Arizona State University Ken.abbott@asu.edu Duncan Snidal, University of Chicago Snidal@uchicago.edu Revised, June 2010 1. Introduction Scholars and commentators assessing the performance of international organizations (IOs) frequently look at the actions of those organizations in isolation, and in addition focus their attention on traditional forms of international governance, such as treaty negotiations and dispute-resolution mechanisms. Such traditional tools of governance require state consent, apply to states, and rely on state implementation and compliance – even when they are ultimately intended to coordinate state regulation of private actors (e.g., ILO conventions addressing actions in the workplace), rather than state actions at the international level (e.g., national tariffs). When commentators observe poor IO performance, moreover, they often call for strengthening those same activities, through additional powers or resources. We call this reliance on traditional state-based mechanisms “International Old Governance” (IOG) (Abbott and Snidal 2009b). By this standard, IO performance is frequently unsatisfactory. There is another way to understand IO performance, however: by taking into account the full range of ways in which IOs can (and do) operate, especially through engagement with non-state actors and institutions. The best known forms of engagement run from private actors to IOs: most of the literature on the subject focuses on techniques by which private actors influence IOs (and states) (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999; Risse 2002; Price 2003) and on arrangements under which they may participate in IO organs and activities (Charnovitz 1996-97; Otto 1996; Betsill & Corell 2001; Corell & Betsill 2001). Here we reverse that image to examine