A.N. Akwanya. Literary Criticism: From Formal to Questions of Method. Nsukka, Nigeria: U of Nigeria P, 2017. ‘Criticism as Judgment’, Introductory chapter (pp. 1-27). Criticism as Judgment Knowledge Requirement for Judging Criticism is used in this book as short for ‘literary criticism’, and quite different from its uses in ‘critical theory’, ‘critical linguistics/critical discourse analysis’, ‘critical hermeneutics’, and so on. To some extent, literary criticism shares with all these something of Fairclough’s determination of ‘“critique” as essentially making visible the interconnectedness of things’ (Wodak 14). But as a practice related to literature, literary criticism has its focus on literary texts. This sense is evidently of ancient date, and frequently alluded to in Aristotle’s Poetics, while in Plato’s Republic, we see it taking place where Socrates is asking questions about the reliability of representations by artists and what such representations can do or be used for. Socrates opens the discussion in Book II of the Republic, with Adeimantus as his interlocutor: Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling, and our story shall be the education of our heroes. By all means. And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the traditional sort?— and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and music for the soul. True. Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards? By all means. And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not? I do. And literature may be either true or false? Yes (64). That literature has a role in education and ‘may be either true or false’ are important judgments, one relating to its function, the other to its logical status. These judgments are stated in the dialogues above as if intuitive. They are affirmed at that level also, as Adeimantus declines the opportunity to challenge them. The dialogue, however, by offering the opportunity to challenge, implies that each of the judgments may be justified by showing the steps that have led to that position. Criticism as judgment cannot be simply intuitive. It must be possible to make explicit the steps followed in saying what it says. Criticism derives from krinō, whose meanings include distinguish, separate, and ‘decide a contest, e.g. for a prize’ (A Greek-English Lexicon 996). This last meaning is picked up in kritēs, that is, ‘judge or umpire’, on which the Lexicon elaborates: ‘at Athens: usually of the judges in the poetic contests’. (997)