1 SENSORIMOTOR AND ENACTIVE APPROACHES TO CONSCIOUSNESS Erik Myin and Victor Loughlin Centre for Philosophical Psychology University of Antwerp Preliminary version of a manuscript submitted for the Routledge Handbook of Consciousness, ed. Rocco Gennaro. Please refer to the published version. Abstract According to the sensorimotor approach, perceptual experience is something we do, not something that happens in us. That is, having perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of engaging with our environments in particular ways. We will argue that the sensorimotor position should best be seen as a form of identity theory. Unlike in the classical identity position however, the sensorimotor approach identifies conscious experience, not with internal or neural processes, but with bodily processes in spatially and temporally extended interactions with environments. After having considered some of the most common objections to the sensorimotor view of perception and perceptual awareness as something we do, we will compare the sensorimotor approach with other enactivist positions, namely Mind/Life Continuity Enactivism, and Radical Enactivism. 1. Introduction