Comp. by: Muthuraj Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0003159423 Date:30/6/17 Time:13:26:47 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0003159423.3D Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 64 3 Modal Adventures between Leibniz and Kant Existence and (Temporal, Logical, Real) Possibilities Ohad Nachtomy ‘ ... nisi . . . Deus existeret, nihil possibile foret’ (GP VI 440) 1 Kant’s refutation of the ontological argument marks a moment in the history of philosophy in which the notion of existence becomes independent from that of essence. Kant’s refutation is based on denying the premise, held by all upholders of the ontological argument, that existence is an attribute or a predicate. 2 As Vilkko and Hintikka remark, ‘if we examine what Kant meant, we can see that his claim was far stronger than what the slogan “existence is not a predicate” expresses. He argued that existence cannot even be a part of the force of a predicate term.’ 3 For all its novelty and consequences for theology, 4 , Kant’s point seems rather straightforward. 5 1 GP VI 440: for the sense of this abbreviation and of others in this chapter, see the note on the method of citation at its end. In rough translation, ‘unless God existed, nothing would be possible’. Leibniz’s dictum is also echoed in his Theodicy §184: ‘Sans Dieu, non seulement il n ’y auroit rien d’existant mais, il n ’y auroit rien de possible.’ ‘Without God, not only would there be nothing existing but nothing would be possible either.’ 2 I am most grateful to Reed Winegar and an anonymous referee from Oxford University Press for very perceptive comments and suggestions. This research was supported by grant 469/13 from the Israel Science Foundation. 3 R. Vilkko and J. Hintikka, ‘Existence and Predication from Aristotle to Frege’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXXIII/2 (2006): 359–77, p. 367. 4 Kant’s refutation of the ontological argument was perceived as most destructive, not only for traditional theology but also for the traditional world-view at large. Heine spoke of Kant as the Weltzer- malemender, ‘the great destroyer in the kingdom of thought’. See reference in Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Rational Theology (Ithaca, 1978), pp. 16–17 and 97. 5 It is perhaps for this reason that, despite its enormous consequences, Kant hardly feels the need to argue for it in the first Critique. I am not claiming that Kant’s argument is flawless. It is worth noting that many philosophers remain unconvinced; see, for example, Graham Oppy’s Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 30/6/2017, SPi