restricted services and facilities (Algeria). Ultimately, the programs had the effect of coercing the populations in new ways, though always appearing as “carceral programs with liberal intent” (p. 211). In the twenty-first century, mass confinement appears in the form of U.S. and Israeli policies toward Iraqis and Palestinians, respectively. Here, the presence of walls and checkpoints, as well as the use of curfews, closures, and stringent and arbitrary processes, lead to the confinement of these populations. Such a strategy requires a particular way of defining and engaging with populations. As Khalili puts it “What is new about counterinsurgency is the explicit emphasis on quotidian knowledge about civilians and not tactical knowledge about combatants. ... The new form of intelligence, pieced together as in a mosaic, includes such prosaic information as the layout of spaces, kinship structures, and everyday needs of civilian populations” (p. 196). While the use of identity cards and other forms of surveillance and measurements dates back to colonial times, the need to further understand the “culture” of a population means by definition a fixed and static notion of culture that can fit knowledge grids. Alongside racial and religious assumptions about males of a certain age or tribe being most suspicious, such policies tend to label entire civilian populations as suspect. In turn, these populations—under constant surveillance by occu- pying forces—experience a form of social engineering and end up feeling subjugated and confined, as opposed to being “protected.” Khalili draws upon Michel Foucault’s work, espe- cially the College de France lectures on “Security, Territory and Population” to explain a number of strategies used in asymmetric warfare. The combination of surveillance, diagnosis, and the potential transforma- tion of people requiring technical/bureaucratic solu- tions instead of political ones becomes the paradigm for management of a population within prisons (in addition to impacting the general population). In the Abu Ghraib prison, for instance, we observe the disciplinary practi- ces (as opposed to blatant sovereign violence) and the Taylorization and bureaucratization of the military. The obsession with categorizing detainees as unlawful, law- ful, ghost, security, and high value, or even uncategoriz- able, while appearing to be a precise classification, was actually highly arbitrary with real consequences for the treatment of detainees. Perhaps because the categories were so amorphous and by their very nature required discretion, the intricate bureaucratization had the op- posite effect of precision since it actually led soldiers to transgress acceptable behavior, especially in a racialized context. While official rules and documents were meant to ensure that torture did not legally take place, the “cool, rational, bureaucratic” definition of techniques merely minimized the appearance of pain, rather than remove it, or as Khalili notes, “through proceduralism evacuate the infliction of pain of its abhorrence” (p. 158). Here, Khalili points to the role of law with the help of experts—doctors and psychologists—in enabling torture with the use of language and proceduralism, rather than ensuring its absence. Humanization in such a context becomes a way to transform the hierarchical relationship between an interrogator and detainee to that of negotiation and management. The relation between coercion and persuasion in the Gramscian sense is also significant for Khalili to explain how counterinsurgencies work and how there are moments of crisis when attempts at hegemony fail and military solutions emerge. One of the questions that is constantly present throughout the book, though inadequately addressed, is the tension between the violence that liberalism is able to accommodate and what it is forced to withdraw primarily as a result of popular mobilizations. While Khalili is absolutely correct in assessing that liberal legalism is perfectly capable of accommodating violence, at the same time there appears to be some doubt about its ability to do so successfully, whether due to chal- lenges by the colonized /occupied people or interven- tions by international and national legal and human rights activists. Gramscian conceptions of balancing coercion with consent and the Foucaldian framework of management of populations are exciting theoretical tools for explaining this tension to some extent, but they may not be adequate to account for the unexpected moments of crisis for legitimacy that may not be easily contained. Overall, Time in the Shadows is an incredible contribu- tion to our understanding of counterinsurgency. The extent to which shadows are easily accommodated within liberal orders, and the challenges their revelation may raise, make this book essential reading for anyone interested in debates on state, democracy, liberalism, racialization, violence, law, and counterinsurgency across all fields of political science and beyond. Enduring Conflict: Challenging the Signature of Peace and Democracy. By Adrian Little. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2014. 176p. $34.95. doi:10.1017/S1537592715003060 — Christopher McIntosh, Bard College Enduring Conflict offers an insightful criticism of the relationship between conflict and democracy that Adrian Little argues predominates in conflict resolution and reconciliation. Democracy is typically viewed as the “solution” to conflict, because peace is the natural state of any democratic government or society. Where conflict continues and peace is absent, politics is inherently non- democratic because the existence of conflict is understood as antithetical to our ontological understanding of December 2015 | Vol. 13/No. 4 1213