An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness Rick Dale, Deborah P. Tollefsen & Christopher T. Kello Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced / Department of Philosophy, he University of Memphis / Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced We review theories and empirical research on underlying mechanisms of selhood, awareness, and conscious experience. he mechanisms that have been identiied for these phenomena are many and multifarious, lying at many levels of space and time, and complexity and abstractness. Proposals have included the global workspace for conscious information, action and its centrality to self awareness, the role for social information and narrative, and more. We argue that phenomenal experience, whatever it “really is,” is probably dependent upon all of these levels simultaneously. We end with two challenges for consciousness research. Both are couched in terms of the dynamics of phenomenal experience. he irst is to investigate the sustained dynamics of phenomenal experience; the second is to unveil the way that multi-scale processes in the cognitive system interact to produce that richness of experience. We do not aim to solve the hard problem, but argue that any solution will require this plural characteristic. . Introduction: A plural approach So-called “qualia” remain a mystery. hey are a mystery partly because we are not really sure if they exist. Some proclaim that they are the very things about which we should be most certain; others proclaim that they are a fanciful illusion, supported only by questionable “intuition pumps” in the form of thought experiments (Dennett 1988). Even if we grant their existence, they seem to be tucked away into irst-person, private experience, inaccessible to third-person science. his irst-/third-person chasm discussed by Nagel (1974) is still seen by many as an obstacle to progress (e.g. Dietrich & Hardcastle 2004; McGinn 2000); others have forcefully endorsed both irst- and third-person perspectives as crucial for making progress in a science of consciousness (e.g. Velmans 1990, 2009). Other disagree- ments abound.