1 1 Concepts of experience in Aristotle, Hegel, and Dewey Tilos conference 2017 Olav Eikeland Wie der Empirismus, erkennt auch die Philosophie nur das was ist... Hegel (1970:8:108) The general heading for these Tilos gatheƌiŶgs is PhilosophLJ as lived edžpeƌieŶĐe. HeŶĐe, I hope discussing the concept of experience will be appropriate. Let me also emphasize from the beginning, that in spite of some possibly excessively assertive claims and obvious simplifications, I consider what follows in this presentation as hypothetical and in need of further elaboration, critical discussion, revision, supplementation, etc. CoŶĐepts like edžpeƌieŶĐe aŶd dialogue were at the center of my dissertation 25 years ago (Eikeland, 1997). Still, discussing them here is unfinished business, especially since this presentation is a ƌeǀisit oƌ ƌefoĐusiŶg afteƌ ŵaŶLJ LJeaƌs of Ŷot absence exactly, but of taking some of the things I will talk about for granted in my work, without giving them focused attention. After listening to Ralph (Bannell) here last year, my planned aim was to discuss and compare concepts of edžpeƌieŶĐe iŶ Aƌistotle, Hegel, aŶd DeǁeLJ. Unfortunately, I doŶ’t thiŶk I will be able to discuss Dewey in a way, which is fair to him. I will present a few hypotheses, though, which may be unfair to him as well but maybe fit for a discussion. Concerning Aristotle and Hegel, I am at least able to sketch my discussion and conclusions in outline with a few quotes provided as examples. In addition, I believe Aristotle and Hegel can and should be discussed together, since I seriously think the basic concept of experience at work in the writings of both is essentially the same. As always with me, however, most of it starts and even ends with Aristotle, and I do not think that is an insult to Hegel. Philosophers like Michael Oakeshott (1933:9), Morris R. Cohen (1953:452), John Dewey (1958:xi-xiii), and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975:329) have all expressed their consternation at the scandalous fact that the concept of experience, while being so central to modern science, is still rarely discussed, and with no real consensus about its meaning. Although many discuss experiential learning in different ways, I think this is still true when it comes to conceptual issues. The three philosophers of my concern here all represent concepts of experience different from mainstream philosophy and research, however. In addition, I claim, their concept of experience is more in line with an important everyday, common-sense usage of the word and concept. In other words, the scientific and philosophical mainstream is not in agreement with important aspects of everyday language, which, of course, comes as no big surprise in a Post-Wittgensteinian climate. On the other hand, for some, this is also exactly as it should be. Science is different, better, and more reliable than everyday cognitions.