EVANGELION’S HUMAN INSTRUMENTALITY PROJECT THROUGH IDEALISM AND EXISTENTIALISM The Human Instrumentality Project in Evangelion has a distinguished forerunner in the histo- ry of contemporary thought – here ‘contemporary’ stands for ‘subsequent to the French Revo- lution’ – who anticipated some of the themes set out all over Anno’s magnum opus and explained (even if only partially) in the last episode of the TV series. I am alluding to Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), the precursor of German idealism and the first prominent figure high school students of philosophy meet, after Kant. Fichte (1794: p. 34) wrote in The Vocation of the Scholar, ‘Could all men become perfect, could they attain their highest and ultimate end, they would all be equal to each other, – they would be only one – but one single subject’. Is this not what Evangelion’s characters yearn for, in the opening lines of the last episode? Why, anyhow, in Fichte’s opinion, can perfection be identified as a union of the individual I’s in a collective I? It is not an easy concept to sum up in a few lines, yet I shall try. The heart of Fichtean argument is the infinite I. This is a term that may appear unclear, but it will turn out to make sense (at least, I hope so) further on. That said, let us move to the following three crucial steps: A. The I poses itself. B. Each statement, on a logical 1 level, has its opposite: so, if the I poses itself, the non-I in- evitably opposes itself to the I. C. Clashing with the non-I, the I shatters into a multitude of finite I’s corresponding to in- dividuals. Every finite I (each of us) is therefore called upon to fight a daily battle against the non-I (the world outside) limiting it, in an effort (streben) to rejoin the infinite I. It is an effort that will never end, for once an obstacle is overcome, another one arises, and so on, in a perpetual strug- gle between I and non-I. One of the most interesting assumptions in Fichte’s theory is that external reality does not exist in itself, but only as it is set up by the I – that is, by the Subject. The Subject does not merely perceive, but even creates the Object. When Shinji is suspended in nothingness, he lies in ‘a world of nothing’ and he is shown that it is ‘the world of perfect freedom (…) in which you have no restrictions’. Just so: Shinji’s condition is a sort of metaphor for the infinite I 2 of the first step, in which the I posits itself, there is only the I: (…) the original I, being alone, is absolutely free, is indeed ‘absolute’, is absolved from restrictions, is free. According to Fichte, there is originally the I, but this amounts to saying there is originally freedom, as the I is not conditioned by anything outside of itself, in the first logical step it is not limited by a non-I, so it is absolute, is completely free. (Gargano, 2004) Herein non-I makes its timid appearance. A horizontal line is drawn and a restriction comes up: ‘you have a top and bottom (…) but you have lost a degree of your freedom’. However, the first differences between Evangelion and German idealism begin to emerge. Fichte is ultimately op- 1 In order to avoid misunderstandings, it should be noted the three steps mentioned above are not to be intended in a chronological way (first A, then B and finally C) but only in a logical one (A implies B, which in turn implies C). 2 By now, it should be evident that ‘infinite’ must be interpreted in the original sense of the Latin word infinitum, compounded from in- and finitum, which means ‘not confined’ or ‘not bound’, and consequently ‘not restricted by anything nor anyone’.