EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT EPISTEMIC AGENCY Pascal.Engel University of Geneva Abstract This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various “Kantian” views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility, in particular the one proposed by Pamela Hieronymi (2007). I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents Key words : agency , belief, responsibility, reasons, Hieronymi (P.) 1. Introduction We often blame people for what they believe – for instance for believing weird, stupid or nasty things. In such cases we disapprove certain contents of thoughts, which we think that a rational, or simply an honest, person should not have. When a person expresses racist beliefs for instance, it is not clear whether we blame the beliefs or the person who is susceptible of having such beliefs. As Lichtenberg said: “Do not blame people for what they believe, but for what their beliefs have made of them”. But in other cases we blame the way beliefs are formed and the believing itself. We say that someone should have, on the basis of the relevant evidence, believed this or that, or that he should not have believed this or that, given that it does not follow from his other beliefs. It is the latter context which seems to licence our talk of epistemic obligations and of people being responsible for what they believe or do not believe, or for what they know or do not know. Of the president of the bank who tells us that he did not foresee the financial crisis, we say that he should have known, given his position, or that he should have had beliefs about the state of the market. Talk of praise and blame for our beliefs, and of epistemic obligations and responsibility, implies, however, that one can make sense of their being epistemic agents, capable of controlling their beliefs. But the idea that we can control our beliefs is notoriously problematic, at least if we mean by this the kind of of control that we have ordinarily on our actions. Hence the following well