1 Panpsychism in the first person Michel Bitbol Archives Husserl, CNRS/ENS, 45, rue d’Ulm, 75005 Paris, France In: S. Rinofter‐Kreidl & H. Wiltsche (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy (Proceedings of the 37 th Wittgenstein Symposium), De Gruyter, 2016 “(In the existentialist branch of phenomenology), writes a critic, one has turned off the mind. It’s just the opposite. It has been put everywhere, because we are not mind and body, we are not a consciousness facing the world, but embodied mind, being‐in‐the‐world” Maurice Merleau‐Ponty Abstract: A central presupposition of science is that objectivity is universal. This does not only create a blindspot in knowledge, but also forces one to ignore it. Several strategies were accordingly adopted to overcome this ignorance, along with the standard divide between continental and analytic philosophy. One of them is Phenomenology, with its project of stripping the layers of interpretation by way of a complete suspension of judgment (epochè), and evaluating any claim of knowledge from such a basis of “pure consciousness”. Another one is pan-experientialist metaphysics, that puts back pure experience in the very domain that was deprived of it by the act of objectification. I compare these two approaches, thereby establishing a hierarchy of radicality between avoiding the blindspot from the outset and compensating for it retrospectively. 1. Introduction Pure experience is elusive because it is not. It is lying at the permanent blindspot of what there is, for the mere reason that it constitutes the precondition of anything that is, namely of anything that may appear. Conversely, sharpening perceptual differences, improving the efficiency of technology, increasing the discrimination of phenomena by scientific theories, perpetuates the blindspot of living and knowing. Something, which being no thing is all the more easy to forget, remains in