DRAFT Causal exclusion and causal Bayes nets * Alexander Gebharter Abstract: In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally be- have like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of cau- sation such as Woodward’s (2003) and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction. 1 Introduction Causal exclusion arguments, most famously advanced by Kim (1989, 2000, 2003, 2005), can be used as arguments for epiphenomenalism or as arguments against non-reductive physicalism. Epiphenomenalism is the view that “mental events * This is the accepted version of the following article: Gebharter, A. (2017). Causal exclusion and causal Bayes nets. Philosophy and Phenomenological Re- search, 95(2), 353–375. doi:10.1111/phpr.12247, which is published in final form at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1933-1592. 1