Naturalistic Decision Making and intelligence of unconscious Mauro Maldonato*, Silvia Dell’Orco** Abstract During the last three centuries, the change from formal to natural logic has allowed us to explain how many of the decisional strategies are coherent with the functioning of the cognitive economy of our species, even if they are limited and fallible. The dificulty in deciding and facing up to uncer- tainty is not only linked to the inadequacy of the architecture of our minds but also to an ‘external’ model of uncertainty which does not correspond to the way in which our mind naturally functions. New conceptual paradigms and new programmes for experimental research are called for in order to redeine the role of internal and external restrictions on human action (re- sources and available information, limitations on calculation ability, on the capacity of memory, cognitive styles, representations and perceptions of risk, unconscious inferences and so on). Introduction It is true that the human mind has accumulated much information and knowledge by means of rational decisions, the vast majority of these de- cisions have been underpinned by a natural logic, with rules that have proved to be advantageous for our evolution. There is now a large body of scientiic evidence to disprove the theory that our mind is equipped with formal schemes of inference able to draw valid conclusions irrespective of the content of the premisses. During the 20th century the economic and psychological sciences highlighted the role of unpredictability and uncertainty in individual decision making. Herbert A. Simon (1955) was among the irst to question the validity of the theory *Department of Human Sciences DISU, University of Basilicata, Potenza, Italy **Department of Human Sciences DISU, University of Basilicata, Potenza, Italy