1 Merleau-Ponty on abstract thought in mathematics and natural science Samantha Matherne (UC Santa Cruz) Forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy Abstract: In this paper, I argue that in spite of suggestions to the contrary, Merleau-Ponty defends a positive account of the kind of abstract thought involved in mathematics and natural science. More specifically, drawing on both the Phenomenology of Perception and his later writings, I show that, for Merleau-Ponty, abstract thought and perception stand in the two-way relation of ‘foundation’, according to which abstract thought makes what we perceive explicit and determinate, and what we perceive is made to appear by abstract thought. I claim that, on Merleau-Ponty’s view, although this process can sometimes lead to falsification, it can also be carried out in such a manner that allows mathematics and natural science to articulate what we perceive in a way that is non-distortive and in keeping with the demands of perception itself. §1. Introduction When we consider the major philosophical contributions of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, what tends to come to mind is his analysis of the role that embodiment plays in perception and action. Far less attention has been paid to his account of thought in general, lesser still to his more specific views about the abstract form of thought involved in mathematics and natural science. However, according to some readers, this is entirely appropriate for, they argue, Merleau-Ponty simply did not have much to say about these matters. Hubert Dreyfus, for one, has claimed that, If [on Merleau-Ponty’s view] perception and action is always involved and holistic, how are we able to entertain propositional beliefs about isolable perceptual objects and their isolable properties and, more generally, how is thought able to make judgments on the basis of perceptual experience? As far as I know, Merleau-Ponty had nothing to say on these subjects so we shouldn’t fault [anyone] for failing to find Merleau-Ponty’s account of what makes abstract thought possible (Dreyfus (2007): 67). 1 This interpretation of Merleau-Ponty has been influential, especially in the context of the Dreyfus- McDowell debates where Merleau-Ponty is mustered in support of the view that normal perception does not involve concepts or thought, but rather the unreflective, skilled bodily activity, which