Interpersonal harm aversion as a necessary foundation for morality: A developmental neuroscience perspective JEAN DECETY a AND JASON M. COWELL b a University of Chicago; and b University of Wisconsin–Green Bay Abstract Growing evidence from developmental psychology and social neuroscience emphasizes the importance of third-party harm aversion for constructing morality. A sensitivity to interpersonal harm emerges very early in ontogeny, as reflected in both the capacity for implicit social evaluation and an aversion for antisocial agents. Yet it does not necessarilyentail avoidance toward inflicting pain to others. Later, an understanding that harmful actions cause suffering emerges, followed by an integration of rules that can depend on social contexts and cultures. These developmental findings build on a burgeoning literature, which suggests that the fundamental nature of moral and social cognition, including their motivational and hedonic value, lies in general computational processes such as attention, approach–avoidance, social valuation, and decision making rather than in fully distinct, dedicated neural regions for morality. Bridging the gap between cognition and behaviors and the requisite affective, motivational, and cognitive mechanisms, a developmental neuroscience approach enriches our understanding of the emergence of morality. Morality is a central aspect of social life and is fundamental to maintaining and regulating interactions in large groups and societies. For over a half century, moral developmental inves- tigations have stemmed from socialization and cognitive de- velopmental constructionist perspectives (Jambon & Sme- tana, 2015). More recently, empirical research influenced by evolutionary theory has focused on the early emergence of implicit social evaluations and preferences toward care and cooperation. These seemingly hardwired tendencies and intuitions emerge very early in ontogeny, and as a result are assumed to be the outcomes of selection pressures due to their adaptive value in promoting group living. Mature morality incorporates multiple dimensions, includ- ing knowledge, values, reputation, and relevant behaviors. It involves both unconscious and deliberate processes such as harm aversion, empathic concern, social emotions (e.g., guilt, remorse, and shame), theory of mind, executive functioning, and abstract reasoning. Human moral decisions are governed by both statistical expectations (based on observed frequen- cies) about what others will do and normative beliefs about what others should do. These vary across different cultures and historical contexts, forming a continuum from social con- ventions to moral norms typically concerning harm to others (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). In contrast to this wide variation in normative beliefs, there is broad consensus that physically harming others and violat- ing considerations of fairness are central to the moral domain (Gray, Young, & Watz, 2012; Hauser, 2006). Prototypical ex- amples of moral rules include those prohibiting killing or in- juring other people, stealing their properties, or breaking promises. Violations of moral rules typically involve a victim who has been physically or psychologically harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has suffered an injustice. As such, most moral transgressions involve a causal relation between the inflicting agent, her/his intentions and actions, and the resulting suffering for the victim. Across cultures, countries, and religions, people draw a distinction between moral and conventional violations in that moral transgres- sions are judged to be more serious and less authority depen- dent (if at all) and conventional transgressions are arbitrary, situation dependent, and have a less prescriptive force (Sme- tana, 2006). This distinction emerges early in development, even as young as 3.5 years old. In this paper, we argue that perception and reaction to in- terpersonal harm provides a window into one rudimentary, yet critical, element of morality. Noticing interpersonal harm alongside the development of empathic concern, theory of mind, and socialization can lead to an understanding that harmful actions cause suffering and an appreciation that complex moral rules and norms depend on contexts within cultures. In this article, we provide a comprehensive mecha- nistic account of third-party harm aversion and demonstrate how it critically contributes to moral cognition and behavior by integrating recent empirical evidence from developmental social neuroscience, developmental psychology, and psycho- pathology, as well as clinical neuroscience. While evidence for the role of sensitivity to interpersonal harm in moral cognition appears convincing, we conclude by suggesting future research directions that are necessary to fully character- ize whether this information and its underlying neural Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Jean Decety, Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, 5848 South University Avenue, Chi- cago, IL 60637; E-mail: decety@uchicago.edu. Development and Psychopathology, 2017, page 1 of 12 # Cambridge University Press 2017 doi:10.1017/S0954579417000530 1 https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579417000530 Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Chicago, on 21 May 2017 at 21:36:02, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at