Electron Commer Res (2010) 10: 291–311
DOI 10.1007/s10660-010-9057-x
On server trust in private proxy auctions
Giovanni Di Crescenzo · Javier Herranz ·
Germán Sáez
Published online: 9 October 2010
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010
Abstract We investigate proxy auctions, an auction model which is proving very
successful for on-line businesses (e.g., http://www.ebay.com), where a trusted server
manages bids from clients by continuously updating the current price of the item and
the currently winning bid as well as keeping private the winning client’s maximum
bid.
We propose techniques for reducing the trust in the server by defining and achiev-
ing a security property, called server integrity. Informally, this property protects
clients from a novel and large class of attacks from a corrupted server by allow-
ing them to verify the correctness of updates to the current price and the currently
winning bid. Our new auction scheme achieves server integrity and satisfies two im-
portant properties that are not enjoyed by previous work in the literature: it has min-
imal interaction, and only requires a single trusted server. The main ingredients of
our scheme are two minimal-round implementations of zero-knowledge proofs for
proving lower bounds on encrypted values: one based on discrete logarithms that is
more efficient but uses the random oracle assumption, and another based on quadratic
residuosity that only uses standard intractability assumptions but is less efficient.
G. Di Crescenzo: Part of this work done while visiting UPC, Spain.
J. Herranz and G. Sáez: Work partially supported by Spanish MICINN Ministry, project
TSI2006-02731.
G. Di Crescenzo ( )
Telcordia Technologies, Piscataway, NJ, USA
e-mail: giovanni@research.telcordia.com
J. Herranz · G. Sáez
Dept. Matemàtica Aplicada IV, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya C. Jordi Girona, 1-3, Mòdul C3,
Campus Nord, 08034 Barcelona, Spain
J. Herranz
e-mail: jherranz@ma4.upc.edu
G. Sáez
e-mail: german@ma4.upc.edu