© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi �0.��63/�87 ��636- � �34�309 journal of the philosophy of history 9 (�0 �5) 393–409 brill.com/jph The Cognitive Function of Narratives Karsten R. Stueber College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA, USA kstueber@holycross.edu Abstract This essay will utilize the central historicist insight about the nature of the historical world and historical writing in articulating the cognitive function of narratives. It will argue that full-blown narratives are best understood as developmental portraits of a chosen entity/ unit in respect to its individuality. The argument will proceed through a critical analysis of the debate between Noel Carroll and David Velleman about the nature of the narrative connection and the question of whether the explanatory force of a narrative has to be understood in causal or emotional terms. I will side with the causalist in this respect but will also show that we need to be very careful in distin- guishing between causal explanations underwritten by a theory and the use made of such causal accounts within the context of narratives concerned with explicating indi- viduality. Accordingly, I agree with Mink that narratives are special cognitive instru- ments. Yet Mink’s characterization of narrative understanding as a “configurational mode of comprehension” that is strictly distinguished from the theoretical mode needs to be amended. Narrative understanding should be conceived as an autono- mous and irreducible mode of comprehension. At the same time, it should be viewed as being dependent on a variety of theoretical perspectives it uses intricately. Keywords narrative explanation – causality – historicism – Mink – Carroll – Velleman Brian Fay deserves special thanks for his insightful comments on an earlier version of this essay. I also would like to thank the audience for their questions at the meeting of the Society for the Philosophy of History at the Pacific APA meeting in San Francisco in 2012.