Abstract. Evolutionary games have considerable unrealized potential for modeling substantive economic issues. They promise richer predictions than orthodox game models but often require more extensive speci®cations. This paper exposits the speci®cation of evolutionary game models and classi®es the possible asymptotic behavior for one and two dimensional models. Key words: Evolutionary games ± Adjustment dynamics ± ESS ± Evolu- tionary equilibrium JEL-classi®cation: B25; C62; C72; C73 1 Introduction Evolutionary games have seized a large and increasing share of the game theory literature in recent years. But economic applications of evolutionary game theory remain few and isolated, while a dominant share of the applied economics literature relies on orthodox game theory. A casual observer might surmise from these facts that the new evolutionary approach is in- tractable or not widely applicable, or that its implications are essentially the same as those of the orthodox approach. * My thanks to the fellows and sta of CentER at Tilburg University for providing the stimulating environment in which this paper was originally written, and to K.C. Fung for his help and encouragement in beginning the project. Vince Crawford, Jorgen Weibull, three anonymous referees, and audiences at Tilburg, Arizona, UCSC and Florence pro- vided useful comments on earlier versions. I retain sole responsibility for any remaining errors and idiosyncrasies. J Evol Econ (1998) 8: 15±43 On economic applications of evolutionary game theory Daniel Friedman* Department of Economics, University of California at Santa Cruz, 212 Social Sciences I, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA