139 Working paper. Chapter to be published in Stephen Minister, J. Aaron Simmons and Michael Strawser (eds), Kierkegaard’s God and the Good Life. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017. Chapter 6 Kierkegaard’s Virtues? Humility and Gratitude as the Grounds of Contentment, Patience and Hope in Kierkegaard’s Moral Psychology John Lippitt In recent years, a growing body of work has connected Kierkegaard with discussions of the virtues. While some have objected to this move, 1 I think this scepticism can legitimately be resisted, provided we understand what connecting Kierkegaard with the virtues does - and does not - necessarily commit us to. Robert C. Roberts has perhaps been the most powerful advocate of the idea that Kierkegaard can profitably be read as exploring various character traits that we should not balk at calling “virtues.” 2 Roberts sees Kierkegaard as part of a tradition he labels “virtuism,” which emphasises such features as our having a common human nature or telos, and developing enduring character traits that hinder or help in the pursuit of that telos. Such traits – which are something we are, rather than just something we do or passively undergo - are dispositions to act, feel, perceive, etc. in particular ways. An excellent trait – a virtue – tends to be endorsed, confirmed and consolidated by the choices of the one possessing it. These traits operate not in isolation, but are interconnected in various ways, such that they tend either to support or undermine each other (virtue tending to beget virtue, and vice to beget vice). Virtues (or vices) tend to make for (or fail to make for) the well-being of their possessor, and to an extent that of their associates. And finally, “virtuists”