1 Morality Between Nativism and Behaviorism (Innate) Intersubjectivity as a Response to John Mikhail’s ‘Universal Moral Grammar’ Lando Kirchmair  ©American Psychological Association, [2017]. This paper is not the copy of record and may not exactly replicate the authoritative document published in the APA journal. Please do not copy or cite without author's permission. The final article is available, as online first publication at http://psycnet.apa.org/record/2017-36458-001 and will be finally published in print in The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 2017, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 230–260: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/teo0000067]. Abstract The thesis of an innate Universal Moral Grammar (‘UMG’) relies upon an analogy to the thesis of a universal grammar of the human faculty of language in linguistics. Drawing upon this faculty, John Mikhail, among others, argues that we humans have an inborn moral grammar. In this article this fascinating thesis is juxtaposed with counter-perspectives from the various fields on which it is based, with substantial criticism from such fields as neurobiology, evolutionary and developmental psychology, and philosophy leaving ample space for doubting UMG and especially its claimed innateness. In methodological terms, Mikhail suggested using collective evidence from the various disciplines to prove the hypothesis of an innate UMG as there is not sufficient substantial support for UMG within each discipline alone. This multi- and interdisciplinary approach is also contested in this article. In lieu of UMG this article proposes thinking of intersubjectivity in order to deal with the origins and development of the biological set-up of human morality. In so doing it refers to Colwyn Trevarthen’s concept of primary, secondary, and tertiary intersubjectivity, which is gaining more and more in popularity. This enables us, so runs the argument, to align morality and its development with core concepts of (developmental) psychology. Such an understanding of morality furthermore lays bare the origins of moral normativity, which is essential in order to evaluate moral behavior.  Lando Kirchmair, Dr. iur. (University of Salzburg, Austria, 2012); Mag. iur. and Mag. iur.rer.oec. (University of Innsbruck, Austria, 2009 & 2010), Postdoc at the Institute for Public Law, Public International and European Union Law, Paris Lodron University Salzburg as well as Postdoc at the Institute for Public Law and Public International Law, Bundeswehr University Munich. Contact: lando.kirchmair [at] gmail.com. An earlier version has been presented at a working group at the “XXVII World Congress of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy” in Washington D.C., USA, from 27th of July until 1st of August 2015 as well as at the research seminar taking place in March 2015 at the Institute for Legal Studies at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. I am grateful to Frances Buttelmann, Sophie Milward, John Mikhail, Norbert Paulo, Csaba Pléh, Thomas Rauter, Szilárd Tattay, Michael Tomasello, the anonymous reviewer as well as to the participants of both events for discussions, comments and stimulating criticism. It remains clear, however, that errors remain mine alone.