Legal Theory, 12 (2006), 293–314. Printed in the United States of America Published by Cambridge University Press 0361-6843/06 $12.00 + 00 LEGAL PROOF AND FACT FINDERS’ BELIEFS * Jordi Ferrer Beltr´ an University of Girona (Spain) In procedural-law scholarship as well as in the theoretical analysis of the notion of proof as a result of the joint assessment of all items of evidence introduced in a trial, reference is frequently made to notions such as the conviction, belief, or certainty of a judge or a jury member about what happened. All these notions underscore the mental states involved in the process of determining the facts on the part of a judge or a jury. In this analysis, I look at the links between beliefs and the justification in the findings of fact provided by the judge or jury in her or its verdict. I. INTRODUCTION In the procedural and theoretical literature concerning the notion of proof, it is common to find the use of certain notions, such as belief, certainty, and conviction of the judge in relation to the facts of the case. The emphasis of discussion of these notions is on the states of mind involved in the judge’s or jury’s determining of the facts. Indeed, on many occasions, it is claimed that the aim of proof is precisely this: that the decision-making body reaches one of these states of mind (i.e., conviction, certainty, absence of doubt, etc.) with respect to the factual premises being proved. 1 All of the states of mind mentioned are related to the propositions being proved and have been studied in philosophy since Bertrand Russell under the name “propositional attitudes.” 2 * I would like to express my thanks to two anonymous reviewers from the journal for the comments and suggestions they provided about a previous version of this paper. Their input enabled me to make improvements and reconsider some important points. Jos´ e Juan Moreso, Daniel Gonz´ alez Lagier, and Daniel Mendonca endlessly read and/or discussed the ideas of this paper with me. Thanks. 1. I should point out that what follows is, or tries to be, a work of general theory of law. For that reason, the analysis tries to be independent of any specific legal regulation of any given legal order. In short, my analysis attempts only to take into account the existence of an organ, judge, or jury that is making decisions that, with or without the constraints of express motivation, involve the proof of factual premises. Furthermore, it may appear that the bibliography and some of the examples tend to be somewhat biased toward civil law, but this is, I hope, purely coincidental. 2. A good introduction to this can be found in M. Vald´ es, Introducci´ on, in PENSAMIENTO Y LENGUAJE.PROBLEMAS EN LA ATRIBUCI ´ ON DE ACTITUDES PROPOSICIONALES 5–22 (M. Vald´ es ed., 1996). 293