1 Habit and Intention (Forthcoming in Philosophia) Christos Douskos Several authors have argued that the things one does in the course of skilled and habitual activity present a difficult case for the ‘standard story’ of action: they are things intentionally done, but they do not seem to be suitably related to mental states. I suggest that once manifestations of habit are properly distinguished from exercises of bodily skills, we can see that habit raises a distinctive sort of problem. I examine certain responses that have been given, as well as responses that could be given on behalf of the standard story to the problems presented by manifestations of habit. These responses rely on the idea of a kind of intention that does not ensue from conscious thought or deliberation. I identify three different problems for this line of response. The conclusion is that habit explains aspects of human behavior that cannot be accounted by ascribing intentions of any kind. Keywords: Habit; bodily skill; subsidiary actions; automaticity; standard story of action. [1] An objection to the so-called standard story of action is that it cannot account for certain kinds of things we do in the course of skilled and habitual activities. 1 According to this story we act intentionally only if what we do causally ensues from mental states with pertinent content. Since many of the things one does in the course of skilled and habitual activities are intentionally done, it would seem that the standard story requires a multitude of mental states to be operative with respect of each one of these. But this seems implausible on several counts. Hence, the objection goes, consideration of the skilled and habitual activities highlights the shortcomings of the standard story of action. 1 Versions of this objection are found in Ruben (2003: chs. 2-3); Pollard (2006); De Nucci (2013); Valaris (2015). Related objections are raised in Wakefiled and Dreyfus (1992); Romdenh-Romluc (2013).