RECONCILING SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM WITH THE UNCONDITIONALITY OF THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW:ASELLARS-I NSPIRED ACCOUNT Dionysis Christias Abstract: In this article, I investigate the possibility of reconciling a radically disenchanted scientific naturalism in ontology with the unconditional and non-instrumental character of the moral point of view. My point of de- parture will be Sellars’s philosophy, which attempts to satisfy both those, seemingly unreconcilable, demands at once. I shall argue that there is a tension between those two demands that finds expression both at the theoretical and practical level, and which is not adequately resolved from a strictly Sellarsian perspective. I will then develop a neo-Sellarsian framework, close to the spirit—if not the letter—of Sellars’s philosophy, which, as I will suggest, can live up to this task. This solution depends (1) on insist- ing on both the semantic irreducibility and explanatory reducibility of moral normativity to non-normative facts, while simultaneously acknowledging that those two di- mensions mutually presuppose and support on another, and (2) on recognizing that the instrumental facets of theoretical-scientific rationality need not imply a coercive attitude toward nature, ourselves, and others. 1 Introduction In this article, I will investigate the possibility of reconciling a Sellars- inspired radically disenchanted scientific naturalism in ontology with the objective, unconditional and non-instrumental character of the moral point of view. However, at first glance, there seems to be an internal, irrecon- cilable tension between a radically disenchanted scientific naturalism in ontology and an equally radically ‘humanistic’ account of ethics which stresses the unconditional value and non-instrumental character of the moral point of view. In this paper, I will examine the ways in which the above tension finds stark expression in the philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars, both at the theoretical level, where it is expressed in the form of mutually Res Philosophica, Vol. 95, No. 1, January 2018, pp. 111–149 https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1588 c  2018 Dionysis Christias • c  2018 Res Philosophica