Paternalism and Right* Paul Schofield Philosophy, Bates College I. INTRODUCTION P ATERNALISTIC laws, as customarily understood, are those that restrict a person’s actions for her own sake. They coerce a person, for instance, with an eye to enhancing her well-being, or to promoting her flourishing, or to maintaining her virtue. Paradigmatic examples include seat-belt laws aiming to protect someone from injury, anti-tobacco policies intended to guard against cancer and disease, regulations designed to limit the extent to which someone may risk her financial future, and laws requiring citizens to behave righteously in their personal lives. Republicans and liberals traditionally look upon such laws with deep suspicion, as both prefer to leave individuals to live as they see fit so long as they commit no injustice in so doing. My goal in this article, though, is to suggest that a variety of paternalistic laws can be defended through appeal to republican and liberal values—that is, they can be defended through appeal to considerations of right, which republicans and liberals both believe justify state action. According to the account I’ll advocate, laws that restrict a person’s actions for the sake of the person herself are justified not on grounds that they promote her well-being, flourishing, or virtue, but on grounds that they’re necessary to ensure that she treats herself rightly or justly. To support this view, I will argue that an individual can relate to herself in ways that parallel how she relates to other individuals—ways that, according to republican and liberal doctrine, legitimately engage the interest of the state. II. ANTI-PATERNALISM As a prelude to the article’s main argument, I wish to clarify what I understand to be the core commitments of the republican and liberal traditions, and to explain how these commitments engender a suspicion of paternalism. Beginning with republicanism, its core commitment is that each individual has a claim to not be *For comments on this article, and for helpful discussions about the ideas it contains, I would like to thank Michael Kessler, Christine Korsgaard, Rachel Neckes, Bill Porter, and two anonymous referees from the Journal of Political Philosophy. I would also like to thank Chris Downey for help with editing. One person deserves to be singled out for special thanks: David Cummiskey offered extensive comments on multiple drafts of this article, and encouraged me to continue pursuing and developing its core argument. I am grateful for his insight and support. V C 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd doi: 10.1111/jopp.12127 The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 26, Number 1, 2018, pp. 65–83