Penultimate draft – please cite the version published in Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism, Basingstroke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 145-170. Moderate Conceptualism and Spatial Representation Thomas Land 7.1 Introduction In this chapter, I approach the debate between conceptualist and nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s doctrine of intuition through the lens of Kant’s theory of spatial representation. This theory is of great significance for the debate, but so far has not received the attention it deserves. 1 One indication of the need for further discussion is the fact that the theory of spatial representation has been invoked on opposing sides of the debate as providing support for one side and presenting a serious problem for the other (for the nonconceptualist side see, for instance, Allais 2009 and McLear 2015; for the conceptualist side see, for instance, Griffith 2012 and Ginsborg 2008). My aim here is to show that the theory of spatial representation supports a certain kind of conceptualist reading, viz., a moderate conceptualist reading. I begin by giving an account of this reading (Section 7.2). I then discuss the aspect of Kant’s theory of spatial representation that speaks in favour of this reading. This concerns the distinction Kant draws between what he calls the original representation of space, on the one hand, and the representations of determinate spaces, on the other, together with the claim that the latter depend on a particular kind of synthesis (Section 7.3). Next, I address three objections that have been raised by proponents of nonconceptualist readings to the conceptualist reading of this aspect of Kant’s theory (Sections 7.4 and 7.5). Finally, I consider a further objection that has been raised by nonconceptualists and that is based on a different aspect of Kant’s theory, viz., the holistic character of spatial representation, and explain why this objection is unsuccessful (Section 7.6). 7.2 Moderate Conceptualism For the purposes of this paper, a nonconceptualist reading of Kant is one according to which intuition does not depend for its objective purport on any exercise of spontaneity. 2 Intuitions 1 For two notable exceptions see Onof and Schulting (2015) and Tolley, this volume. 2 For instances of such a reading see Allais (2009; 2015), Golob (2014), Hanna (2005; 2008; 2011b), McLear (2014b; 2015) and Tolley (2013). The position is usually defined in terms of a dependence on the possession of concepts. While this is not incorrect, I believe it is more fruitful to frame the issue in terms of the dependence