From False Beliefs to True Interactions: Are Chimpanzees Socially Enactive? i For The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds Edited by Kristin Andrews and Jacob Beck Sarah Vincent and Shaun Gallagher In their 1978 paper, psychologists David Premack and Guy Woodruff posed the question, “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” They treated this question as interchangeable with the inquiry, “Does a chimpanzee make inferences about another individual, in any degree or kind?” (526). Here, we offer an alternative way of thinking about this issue, positing that while chimpanzees may not possess a theory of mind in the strict sense (to be explained shortly), we ought to think of them as enactive perceivers of practical and social affordances. As such, we reframe the question: “Are chimpanzees socially enactive?” In the first section, we briefly review the well-known theory of mind and behavior- reading accounts. We then present a more detailed account of the enactivist approach to social cognition. In the second section, we contrast these three accounts as they apply to a number of empirical studies related to social cognition in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), defending an enactivist interpretation of the data. 1. Theory of Mind, Behavior-Reading, and Interaction Theory Theory of mind (ToM) approaches have traditionally assumed that we do not have direct access to the minds of others (Sellars 1956; Gallagher 2016). ii Accordingly, ToM claims that only some form of inference (i.e., either theoretical inference or simulation) makes possible one’s understanding (or “mindreading”) of the mental states of others.