Synthese https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1729-4 Bargaining and the dynamics of divisional norms Justin P. Bruner 1 Received: 1 September 2017 / Accepted: 12 February 2018 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract Recently, philosophers have investigated the emergence and evolution of the social contract. Yet extant work is limited as it focuses on the use of simple behavioral norms in rather rigid strategic settings. Drawing on axiomatic bargaining theory, we explore the dynamics of more sophisticated norms capable of guiding behavior in a wide range of scenarios. Overall, our investigation suggests the utilitarian bargaining solution has a privileged status as it has certain stability properties other social arrangements lack. Keywords Social contract theory · Game theory · Bargaining theory · Axiomatic bar- gaining · Social norms · Evolutionary game theory · David Gauthier · Utilitarianism · John Nash 1 Introduction Broadly speaking, there are two influential approaches to the social contract. The more widely known of these considers the social arrangements rational and self-interested agents would agree to. This is the tradition of Hobbes, continued to this day by David Gauthier and James Buchanan, among others, and is typically discussed in terms of the theory of rational choice. An alternative approach, which harkens back to David Hume, conceives of the social contract as continually evolving. Work in this latter tradition focuses primarily on better understanding social contract formation and how beneficial social arrangements are maintained and modified over time. Contemporary B Justin P. Bruner justin.bruner@anu.edu.au 1 School of Politics and International Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia 123