Identity-Specific Predictions and Implicit Measures of Agency Jeffery G. Bednark The University of Queensland S. K. Poonian The University of Queensland and Université Paris Descartes CNRS (Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, UMR 8242) Kelsey Palghat, Jessica McFadyen, and Ross Cunnington The University of Queensland Our sense of agency is thought to arise from the predictive nature of the action system. While previous research supports the role of motor-specific identity prediction in the sense of agency, it remains unclear whether identity-specific predictions (e.g., the pitch of a tone) that are not uniquely associated with specific motor responses also have a significant role. In the present study, we recorded EEG activity during an interval estimation task to assess the impact of these identity-specific predictions on intentional binding, N1 suppression, and the P3b component. Intentional binding was found for all tones that followed self-made actions, regardless of identity-specific predictability of the tone (i.e., the probability of that specific tone following the action). For the N1 component, consequent tones that followed any preceding event, whether it was an action or initial control tone, resulted in N1 suppression; however, this N1 suppression was not significantly influenced by identity-specific predictions. In contrast, the P3b component was significantly influenced by identity-specific predictions, with a signif- icantly larger P3b elicited by more unexpected tones (i.e., prediction-incongruent tones) than expected tones (i.e., prediction-congruent tones). The overall P3b response was also larger for tones following self-made actions. Based on these P3b findings, it appears that higher-cognitive processes are needed to track violations of identity- specific prediction when a single motor command elicits different sensory events. In conclusion, identity-specific predictions that are not associated with specific motor responses have a minimal impact on implicit measures of agency such as intentional binding and N1 suppression. Keywords: sense of agency, N1, P3, prediction, intentional binding As we move through the world we experience a sense of control over our movements and the sensory events that follow them. This sense of agency is thought to arise from the predictive nature of the action system (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000). According to the comparator model, when a self-initiated action is performed, efferent copies of the motor command are used to predict, and in turn, attenuate the sensory effect of the action (Blakemore et al., 1999; Blakemore et al., 2000). Using this motor-based “forward model” an agent can make predictions about the temporal occur- rence of the sensory effect that should follow the action and the specific identity of the sensory effect (e.g., pitch of a tone). Such motor-based predictions help mediate the sense of agency by detecting when there is a match or a mismatch between the actual sensory effect and the pre- dicted one (Blakemore et al., 2000). While there is a vast amount of research supporting the role of motor-based prediction in the attribution of Jeffery G. Bednark, Queensland Brain Institute, The Uni- versity of Queensland; S. K. Poonian, Queensland Brain Institute, The University of Queensland, and Université Paris Descartes CNRS (Laboratoire Psychologie de la Per- ception, UMR 8242); Kelsey Palghat and Jessica Mc- Fadyen, Queensland Brain Institute, The University of Queensland; Ross Cunnington, Queensland Brain Institute and School of Psychology, The University of Queensland. Correspondence concerning this article should be ad- dressed to Jeffery G. Bednark, Queensland Brain Institute, The University of Queensland, St. Lucia QLD 4072, Aus- tralia. E-mail: j.g.bednark@gmail.com This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice © 2015 American Psychological Association 2015, Vol. 2, No. 3, 253–268 2326-5523/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000062 253