Maintaining Authority George J. Mailath University of Pennsylvania Stephen Morris Princeton University Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania September 26, 2007 1. Introduction The authority of a leader is enhanced when her commands or recommendations for action are obeyed. The authority of a leader is also enhanced when her commands are "principled" - based on good reasons - and therefore the leader is seen to be acting in the interests of her followers. But for a leader interested in maintaining her authority, there is often a conict between these strategies. For example, a U.S. President who regularly proposes legislation to Congress that is defeated rapidly loses authority; but so does a President who must abandon his agenda in order to get legislation passed. 1 In this paper, we use game theory to understand this basic conict between principle and pragmatism which lies at the heart of the problem of maintaining authority. A leading and striking case example is the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States. The court exercises considerable authority through its "power" to adjudicate the constitutionality of laws passed by the United States Congress and the actions of the executive branch. But its power is contingent on its be- havior. If the court’s interpretation of the constitution were suciently at odds with public opinion, the court would lose its considerable prestige and the other branches of government would nd a way to bypass the court’s decisions. To maintain its authority, the court must be obeyed and to maintain obedience, it 1 Neusdadt’s (1960) classic "Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership" highlights this tradeo.