Nicola Claudio SALVATORE ‘Hinges’ and the Boundaries of Epistemic Agency 1 Introduction In this paper, I present and criticize two highly influential anti-skeptical pro- posals inspired by Wittgenstein’s 1 remarks on ‘hinges’, namely Pritchard’s ‘hinge commitment strategy’ 2 and Moyal-Sharrock ‘non epistemic strategy’. 3 I argue that both these proposals fail to represent a valid response to skeptical worries. Furthermore, I argue that following Wittgenstein’s analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’ we should be able to get rid of Cartesian skepti- cal scenarios as nonsensical, even if apparently intelligible, combination of signs excluded from our epistemic practices. 2 The Cartesian Skeptical Paradox The feature of Cartesian style arguments is that we cannot know some empirical propositions (such as ‘Human beings have bodies’, or ‘There are material ob- jects’) as we may be dreaming, hallucinating, deceived by a demon or be “brains in the vat” (BIV), that is, disembodied brains floating in a vat, connected to supercomputers that stimulate us in just the same way that normal brains are stimulated when they perceive things in a normal way. 4 Therefore, as we are unable to refute these skeptical hypotheses, we are also unable to know propo- sitions that we would otherwise accept as being true if we could rule out these scenarios. Cartesian arguments are extremely powerful as they rest on the Closure principle for knowledge. According to this principle, knowledge is “closed” un- || 1 Wittgenstein, 1969. 2 Pritchard, 2012; Pritchard, 2014; Pritchard, 2016. 3 Moyal-Sharrock, 2004; Moyal-Sharrock, 2005. 4 See Putnam, 1981. Authenticated | nicolaclaudiosalvatore@googlemail.com author's copy Download Date | 5/5/18 12:34 PM