This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0), which permits reproduction, adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited. PHILOSOPHY SOUTH Filosofia Unisinos Unisinos Journal of Philosophy 18(3):172-176, sep/dec 2017 Unisinos – doi: 10.4013/fsu.2017.183.07 Imagination is charaterized by Spinoza as the first kind of knowledge (E2p40sch) 3 and it is defined as a way in which the mind regards bodies [contemplandi modum] and their affections (E2p17). As such, imagination is a mode of thought. However, a further mapping of the usage of the concepts imago-imaginari-imaginamus in the Ethics indicates that imagination is a complex ativity involving various kinds of events such as image-making, hallucinations, dreaming, and construction of universals and general notions. Some of these events, such as delirium and visual imagery, arise from the constitution of the body and not from the mind. This distinction between a corporeal and a mental imagination is explicitly stated in Epistle 17 to Pieter Balling, where Spinoza claims that effects of the imagination arise from the constitution of either the body or of mind 4 . Also, in E1app, 1 This paper has been presented in the main program of the 2016 Central Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Chica- go while I was a graduate student at the University of Georgia. The paper was recognized with and funded by the Graduate Student Stipend Award from the APA. 2 Post-doctoral researcher at the University of São Paulo. Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto 315, room 1007, 05508-010, São Paulo, SP, Brazil. E-mail: nastassjapugliese@gmail.com Spinoza’s argument for a bodily imagination 1 Nastassja Pugliese 2 ABSTRACT Imagination is characterized by Spinoza as the first kind of knowledge, and, as such, imagi- nation is a mode of thought. However, in a further mapping of the concept in the Ethics, we see that it is an activity that involves both the mind and the extended body. The standard and idealist interpretation of imagination does not account for its corporeal or extended dimension, leaving aside an important aspect of the activity. Based on the thesis of causal independency of attributes, I will argue against the traditional interpretation and demon- strate that there is an imagination of the body in Spinoza. Keywords: Spinoza, imagination, body, attributes, Balling. 3 Throughout the paper, when referencing the Ethics, the following citation format is used: E stands for Ethics, followed by the part of the book in Arabic numerals, then p for the proposition, followed by its number. The citation ends with additional information such as ‘sch’ for scholium, ‘l’ for lemma, ‘post’ for postulate, etc. 4 Spinoza claims, in the controversial Epistle 17 to Pieter Balling, that “the effects of the imagination [ef- fectus imaginationis] arise from the constitution either of the body or of mind [vel corporis, vel mentis]. […] We find by experience that fevers and other corporeal changes are the cause of delirium, and that those whose blood is thick [tenacem sanguinem] imagine nothing but quarrels, troubles, murders and things of that sort. We also see that the imagination can be determined simply by the constitution of the soul [ab animae constitutione determinari], since, as we find, it follows in the wake of the intellect in all things, linking together and interconnecting its images and words just as the intellect does its demonstrations, so that there is almost nothing we can understand without the imagination instantly forming an image” (Ep 17) (Collected Works, Volume I, p. 803). In this letter, Spinoza is explicitly characterizing imagination as having both corporeal and mental causes. One could argue that the arguments in the epistle are problematic due to its context of enunciation (a reply to a friend on the occasion of his son’s passing) and cannot therefore be considered as strong evidence. So, in order to avoid this criticism, I will show how the problem also appears in the context of the Ethics if we take traditionally accepted interpretations of Spinoza’s metaphysics and epistemology into account. I will not, therefore, limit my argument to the controversial letter 17.