Afterword Care, giving: an ethical critique Stuart J. Murray Precisely because a living being may die, it is necessary to care for that being so that it may live. Only under conditions in which the loss would matter does the value of the life appear. (Butler 2009, 14) It is essential for moral philosophy—philosophy that embraces social, ethical, legal, economic and public policy aspects—to consider what is new and exceptional . . . But a wise philosophy also looks at what has just become ordinary and taken for granted. The taken for granted may have a greater effect on our sense of who we are, of what it is to be a human being, than amazing achievements on the margins of our existence. (Hacking 2006, 13) Caregiving is a difficult concept to capture, if, indeed, it will yield to conceptual- ization. What might it mean to give care? Is it akin to a gift that is mine to give? Is it given freely, without expectation or need of reciprocation? Beneficence directed toward the tendance of mortal creatures? Or is caregiving a vital economy, an exchange? Perhaps it is some persuasion of love? Or is it ultimately a form of benevolent narcissism, projecting myself into the place of the other, and doing unto him or her what I would have done unto me, if, by some twist of fate, the tables were turned? Have I given care when I have followed the “duty to care,” my legal obligation to act reasonably and to prevent foreseeable harm? Few among us would contest that caregiving involves more than the mere administration of medicines, more than mere obedience to law, more than reasonableness or contractarianism. In the terminally ill patient, for example, giving care may mean withholding medicines, or administering others, to alleviate suffering, to hasten death—a mortal economy. In this case we might say that what matters is how care is given, though most I suspect would be dissatisfied to boil this down to the intentions of the caregiver, however “reasonable” they may appear. In giving care, something other than reason strikes us as crucial, and yet we have not quite entered the territory of unreason. And so we struggle in this moment, our language fails us. If giving care is more than simply caring, how is this giving given? How is it “done”? We falter on our metaphors, remain uncertain when we seek to say what we do when we give care, what is given, what received. Review Copy Only - Not for Redistribution Stuart Murray - Carleton University - 8/17/16