Heidegger and the Critique of the Understanding of Evil as Privatio Boni By: Richard M. Capobianco Stonehill College Philosophy and Theology, 5:3 (Spring 1991), 175-186. Page numbers in the original publication are given in the text in brackets [ ]. Abstract [175] Despite the efforts of such notable thinkers as Sartre, Camus, and Ricoeur to affirm philosophically the being of evil, a systematic critique of the traditional metaphysical understanding of evil as privation of being has not yet been fully worked out. The task of this paper is to sketch out just such a critique and to suggest a more adequate philosophical reflection on the being of evil by turning to the thought of Heidegger. Part I examines Heidegger‘s commentary on Aristotle‘s remarks on steresis. Aristotle is our teacher, Heidegger argues, in learning ―to hold on to the wonder‖ of the steresis-dimension of Being (physis), and, thus, to hold on to the wonder that ―lack,‖ ―loss,‖ ―absence‖ - is. Part II considers Heidegger ‘s recognition that the k-not at the very heart of our existence is yet much more complex. He turns to the fragments of Parmenides and Heraclitus to bring to light a dissembling-dimension of Being. Introduction Affirming the ―reality‖ of evil has been a central concern of twentieth century reflection. Literature, film, painting, sculpture, music, psychology, and even physics have all attempted to take into account a disordered dimension of being. Philosophers have been no less concerned with this issue. Existentialists such as Sartre and Camus made this a principal concern in their literary/philosophical work; Paul Ricoeur has examined the problem through an analysis of myth in his important study The Symbolism of Evil; and William Barrett wrote passionately about this issue in the book Irrational Man. Yet, despite such efforts to affirm philosophically the being of evil, a systematic critique of the traditional metaphysical understanding of evil as privation of being has not yet been fully worked out. Consequently, I suggest that by turning to the [176] thought of Heidegger, just such a critique may be sketched out and a more adequate philosophical reflection on the being of evil suggested. Returning to Aristotle and the Notion of steresis