As a part of this initiative, Chahbahar port, North-South Transshipment cor- ridor with Russia, BIMSTEC with Southeast Asian countries and Project Mausam with Indian Ocean states have all commenced. Increasingly, there is concern among a section of the Indian political elite that China through the BRI intends to impose a 21st century variant of the “Middle Kingdom” with hardly any transparency or accountability in project implementation. A Tempting Torch? Malaysia Embraces (and Leverages on) BRI Despite Domestic Discontent CHENG-CHWEE KUIK Associate Professor, National University of Malaysia (UKM) https://eair-caucus.org/dr- kuik-cheng-chwee/ Malaysia is probably the most receptive among ASEAN and East Asian nations in embracing Chi- na’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a new Maritime Silk Road (the “Road”) during his maiden South- east Asian trip in October 2013—weeks after he proposed in Central Asia to build an overland “economic belt” (the “Belt”) along the trans- Eurasian Silk Road—Malaysia has gradually emerged as a focus of Beijing’s BRI diplomacy. This is in part due to the country’s strategic loca- tion between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and in part Malaysian government’s open arms in welcoming China’s capital and wider economic role, despite criticism from the opposition and some socioeco- nomic groups at home. Malaysia’s receptivity is evidenced in three respects. First, in terms of dis- course, Malaysian leaders have openly and repeatedly expressed the country’s support for the BRI at various national and international occasions, even going along with China’s tendency in lumping virtually all major bilateral economic cooperation, including those negotiated and concluded before the rise of Xi, under the BRI framework. Second, Malaysia’s verbal support has translated into concrete developments on ground. Indeed, in a space of few years, Malaysia has forged the broadest range of connectivity cooperation with China in the ASEAN region. These include rail and port construction, port network, industrial parks, and other new forms of economic projects like digital free trade zone and setting up of regional headquarters by Chinese mega corporations in Malaysia. These collab- orations are functionally broad and geographically dispersed, with construction and operation sites covering multiple key areas of the country, from the east to the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, connecting the southernmost stretches of continental Asia between the two vast strategic oceans. Third, the remarkable scope and speed of these developments are due not only to Beijing’s pushes, but also Putrajaya’s own pulls. Indeed, Malaysia-China BRI cooperation is a culmination of bilateral cor- diality, geography, power asymmetry, and fundamentally, its ruling elite’s 652 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 9, Issue 4—2017