Explanation, analyticity and constitutive principles in spacetime theories Ad´ an Sus Department of Philosophy Universidad de Valladolid adansus@fyl.uva.es Abstract Much discussion was inspired by the publication of Harvey Brown’s book Physical Relativity and the so-called dynamical approach to Special Relati- vity there advocated. At the center of the debate there is the question about the nature of the relation between spacetime and laws or, more specifically, between spacetime symmetries and the symmetries of laws. Originally, the relation was mainly assumed to be explanatory and the dispute expressed in terms of the arrow of explanation – whether it goes from spacetime (sym- metries) to (symmetries of) laws or vice-versa. Not everybody agreed with a setting that involves leaving ontology out. In a recent turn, the relation has been claimed to be analytical or definitional. In this paper I intend to examine critically this claim and propose a way to generally understand the relation between spacetime symmetries and symmetries of laws as deriving from constitutive principles. Keywords: Special Relativity; Spacetime Symmetry; Dynamical Symmetry; Constitutive Principles. 1. Introduction: Explanation and ontology in SR Harvey Brown’s approach to Special Relativity (SR) can be seen as a reaction against the orthodox interpretation of the theory: the idea that matter does what it does because spacetime is the way it is. He claims that the usual accounts of how spacetime structure explains the relativistic effects 5 fail: they are unable to say how spacetime forces matter behaviour. And he notes that the direct responsibility for matter behaviour belongs to laws. Preprint: 27 July 2018 PLEASE CITE PUBLISHED VERSION