4 Financing political parties and electoral campaigns in Turkey Ömer Faruk Gençkaya Introduction Political finance is the essential factor for maintaining a competitive political system (Burnell 1998, 7). 1 There are several instruments for regulating political finance (Petak and Mataković 2015). First, the sources of income and spending on party finance and election campaigns should be publicly disclosed. Second, both direct and indirect public funding of political parties and election campaigns should be distributed fairly and equally. Third, a limitation or even ban on private donations, including third-party contributions, is necessary to prevent undue influ- ence. Fourth, the abuse of state resources in political finance should be prohib- ited. Finally, an independent institution to supervise party and election campaigns should be established. Over recent years in Turkey, especially in December 2013, when a big politi- cal scandal was unveiled, 2 trust in all representative institutions, including political parties (21.7%), dropped drastically. 3 A recent report by Transparency International (2014) underlined that “the accountability of the government con- tinues to be low and problems with public procurement especially the number of ‘exceptional procurements’ (closed tenders) made by public offices increased much higher than the international average”. Besides, the Council of Europe’s Group of Countries against Corruption (GRECO) concluded that Turkey’s cur- rent level of compliance with the recommendations on political funding remains “globally unsatisfactory” in terms of transparency and monitoring mechanisms (GRECO 2014). This chapter discusses the scope and impact of the current Turkish regula- tory and supervisory framework on political finance with special reference to the GRECO Evaluation. First, a brief historical development of political finance regime in Turkey is presented. Second, the transparency of the political finance regime is explained with special reference to donations, public finance (direct and indirect) and party accounts. Third, the “independence” and capacity of super- vision mechanisms are evaluated with special reference to their performance. Finally, the basic shortcomings of the political finance regime in Turkey and its remedies are discussed in light of GRECO Evaluations. 15032-0925d-1pass-r02.indd 61 08-12-2017 05:47:24