Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9: 167–185, 2006. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-006-9014-x C  Springer 2006 KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN THE BADNESS OF DISCRIMINATION Accepted: 8 March 2006 ABSTRACT. The most blatant forms of discrimination are morally outrageous and very obviously so; but the nature and boundaries of discrimination are more controversial, and it is not clear whether all forms of discrimination are morally bad; nor is it clear why objectionable cases of discrimination are bad. In this paper I address these issues. First, I offer a taxonomy of discrimination. I then argue that discrimination is bad, when it is, because it harms people. Finally, I criticize a rival, disrespect-based account according to which discrimination is bad regardless of whether it causes harm. KEY WORDS: cognitive discrimination, direct versus indirect discrimination, discrim- ination, harm, hierarchical versus non-hierarchical discrimination, moral status, racism, (dis)respect, sexism, valuation versus non-valuation-based discrimination 1. INTRODUCTION The most blatant instances of discrimination are morally outrageous, and very obviously so. It is less clear what makes an act or practice 1 discrim- inatory; whether all forms of discrimination are morally bad; 2 and indeed why objectionable cases of discrimination are morally bad. This paper addresses these issues. First, I define discrimination. I then argue that dis- crimination is bad, when it is, because it harms discriminatees, and that alternative, disrespect-based explanations of discrimination’s badness are unsatisfactory. 2. DISCRIMINATION DEFINED In many contexts, the term “discrimination” automatically carries a nega- tive evaluation of the relevant act or practice. In other contexts, the term is neutral, and to say that someone discriminates is simply to say, roughly, that 1 I use this formula as a convenient shorthand covering the multitude of things that can be discriminatory, e.g. policies, intentions, attitudes, aims, institutions, objectives, beliefs. 2 I use “bad” as a placeholder for negative moral evaluations. The term is sometimes used in a more narrow sense allowing that while discrimination is unjust, it need not be bad.