A False Promise? Regulating Land-Grabbing and the Postcolonial State (This is the final, pre-proofs draft of an article that will appear in the Leiden Journal of International Law in early 2019) Ntina Tzouvala* Abstract Since 2008, a global ‘land rush’ has been unfolding and so have efforts by international, national and regional actors to position themselves as the principal authorities in the determination of appropriate usages of land. This article examines three of the most influential ‘soft law’ instru- ments, the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment, the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems and Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Gov- ernance of Tenure. Despite their substantive differences, all three documents share a specific form of state-centrism. They imagine the host state of such large-scale investments as internally unitary and externally independent and entrust it with the bulk of responsibilities regarding the management of land investments. However, I argue, this particular form of state-centrism ob- scures the legal and administrative realities of the postcolonial state that is often legally bifurcat- ed and subject to pervasive forms of international authority. Rather, an appreciation of the mul- titude of actors who claim jurisdiction over the lands of the South enables a better understand- ing of the legal mechanics of land-grabbing. Sierra Leone, which has been positioned as a ‘poster child’ for the implementation of such ‘soft law’ instruments, serves as the focal point of this jurisdictional approach to land-grabbing. In this context, the promise of ‘soft law’ instru- ments to make the postcolonial state the guarantor of universally beneficial large-scale land ac- quisitions is shown to be a false one. Key words: land grabbing, international law, soft law, state-centrism, international orga- nizations, colonialism 1