WHAT ‘X DOES NOT EXIST’ SAYS ABOUT WE WHO DO EXIST S YABLO DRAFT OF 1/2/19 1. Overdetermination Imagine an empty world e. Dogs exist is obviously going to be false in a world like that. But why is this sentence is false in e? We are pulled in two directions, I think. One reason Dogs exist is false there is the lack of dogs in e. Another, though, seemingly just as good, is the lack of anything in e. Unless the two reasons are somehow in competition, the falsity of Dogs exist is (very slightly) overdetermined. Is this something that ought to puzzle us? I don’t see why. Compare the way a doorbell ringing might be explained either by someone’s pushing the button or something’s pushing it. If the button is pushed by you yesterday and a snowball today, does the bell ring for “the same reason” both days? Yes, since something pushed the button both days (counting you as a thing for these purposes). No, since it was only yesterday that someone pushed it. It is hard to see how these judgments can be reconciled without allowing that there were two reasons at work yesterday: someone’s pushing the button and something’s pushing it. One might ask in a similar vein whether Cats exists is false for “the same reason” in e as Dogs exist. Thinking of the world’s absolute emptiness, we want to say yes. Thinking of the lack of cats, we want to say no. It is hard to see how these judgments can both be credited without allowing that Dogs exist is false in e both because e is empty and because it is free of dogs. Now, if the falsity of an existence-claim can be overdetermined in this way, then the question arises whether one falsemaker could be in play without the other. Certainly we 1