Compulsory Education and the Tension Between Liberty and Equality: A Comment on Dworkin Peter M. Shne* Professor Dworkin's version of egalitarian liberalism is attractive on the two levels on which any worthwhile political philosophy must be attractive. First, it is centered on a powerful conception of a compelling moral ideal: equal concern and respect fr the lives of all persons. Second, it helps to decide important cases. The ways in which Professor Dworkin asks us to understand equality and social justice often help steer us to persuasive and humane resolutions of disputes involving the use of state power. Those sympathetic with Dworkin's understanding of equality will likewise applaud the ambition of his essay on liberty. In it, he seeks to unite the value of liberty with the value of equality in "a single humanist ideal." 1 Should this ambition succeed, Dworkin would have assuaged a fmiliar liberal concern that allegiance to any robust conception of equality threat ens society's fndamental commitment to liberty. Professor Dworkin's theory-f liberty, however, is not yet developed to the point where it is possible to be certain whether his ambition can be flflled in what he calls the "real real world." 2 Despite Dworkin's effrts to clarify the relationship of liberty and equality under what he takes to be the best conception of the latter ideal, the tension between them still appears likely to bedevil the baseline choice or designation of the goods available fr the auction that he uses to illuminate his conception of equality. 3 A critical aspect of this choice fr any society would be the determination whether parents may bid feely fr control over the upbringing of their children, or whether a society committed to equal resources could justifably limit parental choices in this respect. I do not perceive a way around the tension between liberty and equality in addressing this question, at least as Professor Dworkin's theory structures it. I would, therefre, like to set frth the dilemma by pursuing the problem of compulsory education as it would appear under the Dworkin model-not necessarily to invalidate his model, but as a challenge fr its frther refnement. *Professor of Law, University oflowa; A.B., Harvard, 1974; J.D., Yale, 1977. I would like to thank Professors Manha Chamallas, Ken Kress, and William Buss fr their helpfl comments on this Essay. 1. Dworkin, What Is Equalt? Par 3: The Ple of Lber, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1, 12 (1987). 2.Id. at 46. 3. Id. at 18. 97