1 Islam in Xinjiang: “De-Extremification” or Violation of Religious Space? Written by Joanne Smith Finley. ONLINE HERE: http://theasiadialogue.com/2018/06/15/islam-in-xinjiang-de- extremification-or-violation-of-religious-space/ As recently reported in the press, since Spring 2017, hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs and other minority Muslims in Xinjiang have “disappeared” into “political re-education centres,”euphemistically labelled mäktäp (Uy. schools) by frightened locals. Their purported crimes vary from travelling abroad to study (or having a relative who did so) to having Western social media apps on their phone. Most are taken simply because they “appear too religious” or holdfast to religious practice. Detainees are held in these extra-judiciary internment camps for months without charge or due process, ostensibly required to study the Chinese language and Chinese laws on Islam, whilst learning to appreciate the benevolence of the Chinese Communist Party. This “People’s War on Terror” is not surgical like earlier “Strike Hard” campaigns against “illegal religious activities”; rather, it is a “carpet-bombing approach”, described by the state itself in terms of an indiscriminate use of “weed-killer”. In one case, a female undertaker was imprisoned for washing bodies according to Islamic custom. In another, a man in his sixties was incarcerated for “possession and dissemination of extremist religious content” after sending a non-authorised explanation of the Qur’an (Uy. tabligh) to his daughter’s mobile phone. In a third, a Uyghur student studying in the U.S. was incarcerated for 17 days when he attempted to visit relatives in Xinjiang, and forced to watch videos on appropriate interpretations of Islam. There have been reports of torture and death in custody of respected religious scholars. Frequently, the state conflates non-violent nationalist sentiment with “religious extremism”. One early victim was master dutar player, Abdurehim Heyit, detained over his song “Fathers” (Uy. Atilar), which employs the phrase “martyrs of war” in reference to the sacrifices of Uyghur ancestors. He has since been sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and told he will never perform live or record songs again. The CCP claims it must halt the “penetration of extremification” within society, as outlined in the XUAR Regulations on De-extremification (2017). Stated goals include “making religion more Chinese” (Article 4); prohibiting the rejection or refusal of public goods (e.g. alcohol or cigarettes) and the “generalization of the concept of halal into areas beyond halal foods” (Article 9); leading believers to “establish correct beliefs” (Article 13); and guiding believers to “correctly handle the relationship between law and religion” whilst confirming “correct faith” (Article 35). Yet the true aim of China’s surveillance state in Xinjiang seems rather to be to erase the religious (Islamic) identity of Uyghur communities, via a racist system of cultural cleansing. Intrusive religious policing practised in Xinjiang since 2012 has accelerated since the arrival of new Party Secretary, Chen Quanguo, in 2016. Those not yet interned in the camps must endure the “Becoming Family” policy, involving visits to Uyghur homes by Han “relatives”. Over 10,000 teams of visiting officials descended on rural Xinjiang in 2017 to report on “extremist” behaviour such as not drinking alcohol, fasting during Ramadan, sporting long beards, and possessing “undesirable” items like Qur’ans. Individuals are categorised as “trustworthy,” “average” or “untrustworthy”